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We study the effect of an ethanol expansion on carbon emissions using Brazilian energy data 
from 1981 to 2018. We find that greater ethanol production provides a perverse incentive for 
Brazilian oil producers to increase their rate of oil extraction. We report that following a cubic 
meter rise in the one period lagged change in Brazil’s ethanol production, change in oil 
extraction increases between 0.53 m3 to 0.64 m3 in the current period, a weak green paradox. 
These estimates translate into short-run and long-run elasticities of 1.5 and 4.9 respectively, 
implying that a one percent rise in the change in ethanol production now would increase change 
in oil production by 1.5 percent in the short-run and 4.9 percent in the long-run. Also, net CO2 
emission in Brazil is positive if the reduction in CO2 emission as a result of substituting ethanol 
for oil on a one-for-one basis is less than 73 percent in the short run and 244 percent in the long 
run, thus, evidence for a strong green paradox. The results indicate that Brazil’s well-intended 
ethanol policy may have resulted in detrimental outcomes that go against the objectives of the 
policy. We recommend that, at the very least, Brazil and other policymakers should critically 
evaluate a single policy such as an ethanol subsidy used in isolation to ascertain whether or not 
their implementations have the potential of increasing fossil fuel extraction and ultimately 
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The rise in the world’s temperature beyond the pre-industrial baseline has raised world 
governments' interest to tackle climate change in a more aggressive manner. The primary source 
of the world’s greatest public good problem (Sinn 2008) is the emission of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). Since the start of the industrial era (around the 1750s), human-produced greenhouse 
gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide, and methane have caused much of the 
observed increase in Earth's temperatures. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that the main cause of climate change is through 
human activities and the principal gas contributing to global warming is CO2. Much of the CO2 
released into the atmosphere is through fossil fuels (IPCC 1997). 
During the 2015 United Nations climate conference in Paris, each member country 
communicated their “nationally determined contribution” toward the realization of limiting 
global warming. Brazil presented a biofuel policy that is aimed at reducing domestic GHG 
emissions by 37% by 2025 and 43% by 2030 (Dessureault and Zimmerman 2019). These targets 
were based on the 2005 domestic emissions level. To achieve these targets, the Brazilian 
government aims to increase biofuel consumption, increase the share of advanced biofuels, 
increase ethanol supply, and increase the share of biodiesel in the diesel mix. Specifically, Brazil 
plans to increase the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix to about 18% by 
2030 (Federative Republic of Brazil 2015). Also, Brazil targets 45% of renewables in its energy 
mix by 2030, including expanding the use of renewable energy sources as well as expanding the 
use of non-fossil fuel energy sources domestically. 
A number of programs have been implemented to ensure the accomplishment of Brazil’s 
climate targets as well as boosting the growth of sugarcane ethanol. One of such programs is the 
ProAlcool program for ethanol initiated in 1975. The program is designed to capitalize on 
Brazil’s comparative advantage in the production of sugarcane, a major raw material for ethanol 
production. The main objectives of the program are to reduce the national dependence on oil 
imports, promote technical and industrial development through ethanol fuel production, and 
strengthen the sugarcane and sugar sectors (Johnson and Silveira 2014). As a result of Brazil’s 
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long-standing national ethanol program, biofuels in Brazil accounted for about 25% of road 
transport fuel demand compared to less than 3.5% globally (IEA, 2015). 
In 2017, Brazil instituted another “national biofuels policy” referred to as RenovaBio. In 
addition to contributing to the country’s commitment under the Paris Agreement, RenovaBio is 
aimed at promoting the production and use of biofuels in the national energy matrix. Through 
RenovaBio, Brazil provides preferential treatment for ethanol under both its Contribution for 
Intervention in Economic Domain and the Social Integration Program. In addition to the central 
government’s support, several other Brazilian states provide differential treatment for ethanol 
consumption through the use of state-level taxes for the circulation of goods and services 
(ICMS). For instance, while the ICMS tax charged on ethanol varies between 12 to 30 percent, 
the tax on gasoline ranges from 25 to 34 percent. To prevent ethanol imports and encourage local 
production, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce (MDIC) imposed an annual 
tariff-rate quota (TRQ) of 600 million liters on ethanol imports. Imports above the quota are 
subject to the 20% Common External Tariff under the Mercosur agreement.1 
While promoting local production and the use of biofuels particularly sugarcane ethanol in 
Brazil, ethanol produced is supplied to a very unique Brazilian market. The share of the Brazilian 
automotive market is dominated by one-liter engine cars, which in the 1990s became the symbol 
of the Brazilian automotive industry, reaching over 70% of sales in 2001 (Posada and Facanha 
2015). Brazil continues to be amongst the largest automobile market worldwide and accounts for 
over half of all vehicles sold in Latin America (Posada and Facanha 2015). In addition, Brazil is 
the only country in the world with fuel stations that have at least one pump dedicated exclusively 
to pure hydrated ethanol (UNICA 2015). The passenger car market in Brazil is dominated by 
flex-fuel vehicles (FFV) that are designed to run on gasoline (E22), ethanol (E100), or any 
combination of both fuels (ICCT 2017). Starting in 1976, FFV owners faced flexibility in their 
choice of fuel as all filling stations in Brazil installed ethanol fuel pumps during the 
commencement of the ProAlcool program. 
By mid-2010 about 70 FFV models were available in the market, and a total of 15 car 
manufacturers produced flex-fuel engines by the end of 2013.2 This dominated all light vehicle 
 
1 The Mercosur agreement is an international trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur states - 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
2 UNICA, 2010. 
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segments except sports cars, off-road vehicles, and minivans (Posada and Facanha 2015). As of 
December 2019, over 96% of the annual newly registered vehicles in Brazil were FFV (UNICA 
2019a). While the fleet of flex-fuel cars has progressively increased over the years, the fleet of 
gasoline cars has consistently declined. The estimated Brazilian flex-fuel vehicles increased from 
12 million fleets in 2010 to 30 million fleets in 2019 (UNICA 2020). During the same period, the 
fleet of vehicles that run on gasoline dropped from 13 million to 7.6 million (UNICA 2020). 
Brazil’s ProAlcool and RenovaBio programs demonstrate the regulatory efforts the country 
has made and continues to make to promote the consumption of biofuels and ultimately curb 
carbon dioxide emissions. As indicated by Grafton et al. (2012), the main stimulus to the use of 
biofuels is policies that encourage the substitution from fossil fuels, aided by supporting 
mechanisms, such as subsidies and tax exemptions. However, as Brazil and other world 
governments at large continue to adopt technologies that are low on carbon emissions, some 
evidence suggests that such well-intended policies may result in adverse, unintended 
consequences that contradict the very objective of such policies. This is the phenomenon 
popularly referred to as the green paradox. 
One of the insights from the green paradox literature is that, similar to carbon taxes, the 
availability of a cheaper alternative to fossil fuels can trigger the phenomenon. As shown by 
Grafton et al. (2014) and van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012), a declining price of a substitute 
either as a result of technological progress or subsidies can result in a green paradox. Grafton et 
al. (2014) showed that US biofuel subsidies offered a pervasive incentive for fossil fuel 
producers to increase their rate of extraction, accentuating climate change damages. Similarly, 
Grafton et al. (2012) and Van Der Ploeg & Withagen (2012) reported that the combination of 
subsidies for renewable energy and the anticipation of cheaper renewable backstop technologies 
may induce an increase in the current rate of fossil fuel extraction. 
Will Brazil’s biofuel policy of encouraging the production and use of ethanol trigger a green 
paradox? This is the critical question we ask in this study given the fact that oil production in 
Brazil is hugely influenced by the state through Petrobras with little private sector involvement.3 
Directly or indirectly (through incentives/mandates), the government can influence or set both oil 
and ethanol production which contrasts other Green Paradox settings where we worry about what 
 
3 The private sector activities increase due to the introduction of Concession Bidding Rounds, amendment of the 
Production Sharing Law, and Petrobras’ decision to encourage divestment of both upstream and downstream assets. 
4 
oil producers will do following an incentive given to ethanol producers. To investigate whether 
this is a concern or not, we explore the unique Brazilian fuel market and construct and administer 
an empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis. Specifically, we test (1) if promoting the 
production of biofuels particularly ethanol in Brazil has encouraged fossil fuel producers to 
increase their current extraction rate (a weak green paradox) and (2) whether the increased 
production of ethanol through its implication on oil has resulted in higher CO2 emissions, thus a 
strong green paradox. 
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With an estimated population of over 211 million people and a land size of 8.5 million km2, 
Brazil is the second-largest producer of biofuels, behind the United States. Brazil’s experience 
with biofuels dates back to the 20th century. Nonetheless, the first global oil crisis in the 1970s 
(due to the oil shortage resulting from an oil embargo enacted by some members of OPEC) 
spurred the Brazilian government to initiate a large-scale biofuel program, specifically fuel 
ethanol. In responding to the crises, the Brazilian government decided to reduce the national 
dependence on imported oil and create domestic demand for its surplus sugarcane market. 
Hence, in 1975 the government of Brazil inaugurated the national ethanol program ProAlcool. 
After the second oil-shock in 1979, the government decided to expand the program to 
provide support for large-scale hydrated ethanol producers to supply cheaper fuel. The program 
provided three drivers for ethanol as fuel (Goldemberg 2008). First, state-owned oil company 
Petrobras provided guaranteed purchases from sugarcane farmers, removing fears of lost 
investment. Second, the government provided soft loans for ethanol-producing firms. Lastly, the 
government ensured that ethanol at the pump fetched a price of at most 59% that of gasoline. 
These incentives from the program promoted the use of vehicles running on pure ethanol in 
Brazil in the 1980s. 
Following the expansion, the first 16 Petrobras gasoline stations started supplying about two 
thousand ethanol adapted vehicles with neat hydrous ethanol. During the second half of 1979, the 
first modern commercial car to run exclusively on ethanol (E100), the Fiat 147, was launched 
(Bastos 2007). Other automobile factories were lured by the numerous ethanol incentives (such 
as tax incentives, the blending mandates, and subsidies for sugarcane expansion among others) 
provided by the Brazilian government to modify gasoline engines to support hydrous ethanol. 
This period marked the second phase of the ProAlcool program and was characterized by rapid 
growth in hydrated ethanol production and increased production of passenger vehicles with 
Chapter 2 – 
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ethanol engines.4 Soccol et al. (2005) report that “the rapid growth in hydrated ethanol 
production resulted in a large surplus of gasoline which had to be exported, forcing Petrobras to 
make costly changes to its oil refining structure”. 
In the early 1980s, hydrous ethanol became highly attractive to consumers primarily because 
of the Brazilian government’s strategy to peg the pump price of hydrous alcohol at 64.5% of 
gasoline price (Goldemberg 2008). This led to a significant rise in registration (Figure 2.1) and 
sales of vehicles with neat-ethanol engines, occupying more than 90% shares of overall vehicle 
sales (Cortez et al., 2016). Goldemberg (2008) reports that the total fleet of neat-ethanol fuelled 
vehicles reached 5 million. Several service stations had reservoirs to service engines that run on 
solely anhydrous ethanol as well as ethanol-gasoline blends at 20% to 25% ethanol. However, 
there remained uncertainty in the ethanol market, mainly because neat-ethanol vehicle owners 
could not use their vehicles in neighboring countries and in some Brazilian regions which did not 
have service stations equipped to supply pure ethanol (Goldemberg 2008). Also, there were 
doubts about whether the expanding ethanol demand could be met by producers. 
 
Figure 2.1. Registration of new vehicles by fuel type 
Source: ANFAVEA (2020) 
 
4 These vehicles could only burn ethanol and are different from flex vehicles (able to run on more than one fuel). 
There are two types of ethanol, hydrous and anhydrous. Hydrous (or wet) ethanol is the most concentrated grade of 
ethanol and is used in E100 vehicles. Anhydrous ethanol, however, is mixed with variable proportions of gasoline up 
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The credibility of ProAlcool began to fall during the third phase of the program in 1986. The 
period was characterized with the shortage of ethanol amidst the rapid increase in ethanol-fuelled 
vehicles, political uncertainty (resulting from the end of the Military Government and the 
implementation of the New Republic Regime), low costs of oil on the international market, low 
domestic price of ethanol, high international sugar price, low cost of imported ethanol and 
methanol from the USA among others (Soccol et al., 2005; Cortez et al., 2016). This resulted in 
stagnation and affected the credibility of the program. The stagnation caused the fleet of 
passenger vehicles fuelled by pure ethanol to drop from 94% in the middle of the 1980s (apex of 
the alcohol era) to about 51% in 1989 (Soccol et al., 2005; Rosillo-Calle & Cortez, 1998). 
However, the increased anhydrous ethanol blending mandate ensured that the total ethanol 
demand was maintained. 
In the early 1990s, many vehicle users gradually abandoned the use of ethanol-powered 
vehicles due to ethanol shortages and inadequate ethanol service stations (ANFAVEA 2019). 
Annual hydrous ethanol production reduced significantly between 1995 and 2000 (the fourth 
phase of ProAlcool), declining by half from a total volume of 10 billion liters to 5 billion liters 
(Empresa de Pesquisa Energetica (EPE) 2015). The sugarcane surplus production was channeled 
to the production of sugar and anhydrous ethanol. The consumption of anhydrous ethanol 
continued to increase due to the blending mandate and the increased sales of gasoline vehicles. 
Also, the tonnes of Brazilian sugar exported increased significantly from 0.8 million in 1990 to 
7.48 million after a decade, contributing to a decline in sugar price on the international market 
from 316.7 US$/t to 192.1 US$/t (MAPA, 2011). During this period, the Brazilian government 
liberalized the prices of anhydrous and hydrous ethanol in 1997 and 1999 respectively from the 
64.5% cap. A year after liberalizing the price of hydrous ethanol, the government deregulated the 
sector and ended the subsidy for hydrous ethanol (Giacomazzi 2012; Valdes 2011). 
Aiming to restructure the sector and take advantage of Brazil’s comparative advantage in 
sugarcane production, various associations consisting of sugarcane mills and producers joined 
efforts to define the sector’s interests. In 1997, the efforts of these associations resulted in the 
formation of  União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar (UNICA), mandated to establishing a 
competitive sugar-energy sector capable of competing globally and sustainably in the production 
of ethanol, bioelectricity, and sugar (Cortez et al. 2016). The organization remains the largest 
representative organization for Brazil’s sugar and ethanol sector and is responsible for about 60% 
8 
of overall sugar production and more than 50% of all ethanol produced in Brazil. Largely, the 
organization has been successful by far. However, the Brazilian sugarcane industry is still 
characterized by uncertainty in sugarcane yield – the main feedstock in Brazil’s ethanol 
production due to the crop’s high sensitivity to weather conditions.5 
In 2000, the state of São Paulo reduced the state tax and provided an incentive for ethanol 
production (Cortez et al., 2016; Rosillo-Calle & Cortez, 1998). Around the same period, the 
Federal Government also demonstrated great interest in ethanol and its potential for the future. 
This period marked phase five of ProAlcool, the era of flex-fuel vehicles. The introduction of 
flex-fuel vehicles in 2003, revived the vehicle and fuel industries, turning a new phase of 
expansion for the ethanol industry (Cortez et al. 2016). Ethanol production saw a massive boost 
in this period (Figure 2.1). Flex-fuel vehicles eliminated the problems consumers initially faced 
since they can run on blends from E0 to E100. These engines were built with an intelligent 
control system that could recognize the ethanol and gasoline levels in the fuel and automatically 
self-calibrate for the best possible operation (Goldemberg 2008). 
 
Figure 2.2. Evolution of ethanol production in Brazil 
Source: UNICA, 2019b 
 
5 More of this developments are covered extensively in the Oil and Gas Year Brazil 2019 published in collaboration 
with the Rio de Janeiro State Federation of Industries (Firjan) and Brazil’s National Agency of Petroleum, Natural 

























































Flex-fuel vehicle owners have the flexibility to decide which type of fuel to use based on 
personal preference and the relative pump prices of hydrous ethanol and gasoline. Most flex-fuel 
vehicle owners switch to hydrous ethanol when their relative price is lower than 70% of gasoline 
price (Cruz, Souza, & Cortez, 2014; Nogueira & Capaz, 2015). Nogueira & Capaz (2015) assert 
that flex-fuel vehicle owners consider the ratio of ethanol and gasoline prices when making their 
purchasing decision. “After considering the differences in heating value and efficiency when 
using these fuels, consumers have assumed the indifference price of ethanol as 70% of gasoline 
price” (Nogueira & Capaz, 2015). Using revealed preference approach, Salvo and Huse (2013) 
observed that about 20% of FFV users choose gasoline when the pump price of gasoline is 20% 
above the price of ethanol in $/km terms. Likewise, 20% of FFV users choose ethanol over 
gasoline when ethanol is priced 20% above gasoline in $/km terms. However, Cruz, Souza, & 
Cortez (2014) advise that there is a need to educate FFV owners to take into consideration the 
positive externalities of ethanol and not only the relative prices of alternative fuels. 
The consumption of hydrous ethanol has increased in recent years while gasoline has 
dropped (UNICA 2020). About 17% of Brazil’s energy needs are provided by sugarcane and over 
40% of Brazil’s gasoline needs have been replaced by sugarcane ethanol. Between 2009 and 
2018, the total fleet of ethanol vehicles in Brazil more than tripled while the gasoline fleet of 
vehicles dropped by 40% (Ibid). As of 2018, out of the 37.5 million estimated Brazilian 
automobile and light vehicle fleet, 76% (28.6 million) were FFVs while gasoline-only and 
ethanol-only vehicles made up 22% (8 million) and 1% (half a million) respectively of the total 
(Ibid). Also, 87.4% of newly registered vehicles in 2019 were flex-fuel (ANFAVEA 2019). 
The introduction of FFVs coupled with the ethanol-gasoline blending mandate has created a 
demand for Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol (Cortez et al. 2016). Since the introduction of ProAlcool 
until the third phase in 1992, the mandatory blending mandate of ethanol fuel with gasoline 
fluctuated between 10% and 22%. Currently, Brazil’s ethanol blend requirement in gasoline is 
27% (Table 2.1), and a gradual rise in biodiesel blends from 8% (B8) 2017, to 9% (B9) in 2018, 
and it’s currently set at 10% (B10) since March 2019. The percentage of the ethanol blend is 
based on sugarcane harvest in a particular season and the production levels of sugarcane ethanol, 
resulting in blend variations even within the same year. 
 
10 
Table 2.1. Historical evolution of ethanol blending mandates in Brazil 
Year Ethanol Blend Year  Ethanol Blend Year Ethanol Blend 
1931 E5 1993-1998 E22 2008 E25 
1976 E11 1999 E24 2009 E25 
1977 E10 2000 E20 2010 E20-25 
1978 E18-20-23 2001 E22 2011 E20-25 
1981 E20-12-20 2002 E24-25 2012 E20 
1982 E15 2003 E20-25 2013 E20-25 
1984-1986 E20 2004 E20 2014 E25 
1987-1988 E22 2005 E22 2015 E25-27 
1989 E18-22-13 2006 E20-25 2016 E27 
1992 E13 2007 E23-25 2019 E27 
Source: Rico (2007), Table 3.8, Pg. 81–82; USDA GAIN (2019), Pg. 5. 
As of 2015, Brazil had 383 installed ethanol mills (362 were in operation while 21 had 
operating permission – but were not operating). The total capacity of ethanol production (both 
hydrous and anhydrous) in that period stood at approximately 38 billion liters per year (Cortez et 
al. 2016). In 2019, domestic ethanol production was 33,102.91 thousand m3 (Figure 2.2) with 
domestic consumption accounting for over 80% of total production. Brazil imported an 
additional 9,168 thousand m3 of ethanol for approximately $602 million (ANFAVEA 2019). 
However, the ethanol export volume in the same period stood at 12,158 thousand m3 generating 
revenue to the tune of $993 million (ANFAVEA 2019). Currently, about 10 million hectares 
representing approximately 12% of total farmed hectares (which translates into 1.2% of Brazil’s 
total land area) is used for the cultivation of sugarcane (UNICA 2019b), the main ingredient for 
Brazil’s ethanol. 
Although the success of Brazil’s ethanol policies is subject to debate, it is generally accepted 
that the policies have resulted in a positive environmental impact (Rosillo-Calle & Cortez, 1998), 
however, there is little empirical evidence to support it. The environmental impact of the series 
of “green” policies are yet to be adequately assessed both at the production and consumption 
levels. Ethanol is widely accepted to lower carbon dioxide emissions relative to fossil fuels (Hill 
et al., 2006 and Farrell et al., 2006) however, the processes leading to the extraction of the final 
product such as burning sugarcane fields, a common practice in Brazil remains a major concern 
due to the adverse environmental and health implications. To confidently assess the effectiveness 
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of Brazil’s ethanol policies in terms of their impact on climate change, an empirical investigation 
is essential. Consequently, this study investigates the Brazilian fuel market and provides 
empirical support for the effectiveness of Brazil’s ethanol policies on carbon emissions. 
2.1 Literature Review 
The green paradox originates from the supply response from fossil resource owners following a 
policy change that threatens their profitability. The Hotelling rule—that for non-renewable 
resources, the net price (market price less marginal cost) must rise at the rate of any interest-
bearing instrument such as the rate of interest in a competitive market—forms the theoretical 
core for analyzing the green paradox and non-renewable resources at large. Named after Harold 
Hotelling in his 1931 paper “The economics of exhaustible resources,” the rule has been used by 
economists as a theoretical and conceptual framework for analyzing the long-run evolution of 
prices and supplies of non-renewable resources. The rule assumes that non-renewable resource 
owners operate in an efficient market (with no sources of market failure), enjoy scarcity rents, 
and maximize their profits by deciding when to extract their resource whose complete stock is 
known. 
However, in practice, the resource stock is unknown. In his book The Growth Spiral, 
Binswanger (2013) surmises that Hotelling only considered extraction, which reduces the stock 
of reserves and completely ignored exploration which increases the stock of reserves. In 
Hotelling’s simple model, extraction cost had no tendency to rise irrespective of the depth of 
extraction. However, in reality, the cost of extraction increases (referred to as the degradation 
effect) as owners continue to dig deeper to get more of the resource out of the ground. The 
degradation effect may cause a decline in the scarcity rent, and a stronger degradation effect may 
completely erode all the scarcity rent, resulting in economic exhaustion—a situation where the 
cost of further extraction becomes higher than the market is willing to pay (Livernois, 2009). 
There are several extensions to the original Hotelling (1931) rule that address the limitations 
of the original rule6(Slade and Thille 2009). Most relevant to this study is the extension to the 
monopoly setting where rent is now defined as marginal revenue minus marginal cost, instead of 
price minus marginal cost in a competitive market setting. In general, monopolists will sit on 
 
6 Slade and Thille (2009) indicate a number of extentions that have been added to the orignial Hotelling (1931) rule. 
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their stock longer to maximize profits relative to the competitive firm. This provides a theoretical 
basis for understanding Petrobras’ behavior in the Brazilian context. 
Fossil fuel use results in carbon emissions, a serious external cost that most climate policies 
attempt to address, again ignored in the simple Hotelling model. Furthermore, technological 
advancement and the impact of alternative energy sources receive no consideration in the 
traditional Hotelling model. In general, the Hotelling rule implies that extraction diminishes the 
stock of fossil reserves and price rises to reflect both rising scarcity and marginal extraction cost, 
a pattern that is to a large extent, difficult to reconcile with historical data and is notoriously at 
odds with reality which has invited several criticisms.7 Sinn (2015) reports that the real oil prices 
in the mid-2015 reflected the hikes in oil prices that occurred before mid-1979—the oil price 
hike leading to the second oil crisis. Nonetheless, insights from the theory remain useful in 
analyzing how the market for non-renewable natural resources will evolve. 
Sinn (2008) ignited the debate and research into the green paradox phenomenon. He and 
many others regard carbon emissions as the world’s greatest market failure and largest public 
goods problem and recognize the efforts governments are making to address the issue.8 However, 
the author’s discontent stems from the fact that the efforts aimed at reducing carbon emissions 
have largely focused on reducing the demand for fossil fuels—ignoring the supply side of the 
problem. According to Sinn (2008), CO2 concentration in the atmosphere depends on extraction 
which occurs as a result of the interaction of demand and supply. Focusing solely on the demand 
for fossil fuels and ignoring supply is ineffective. Sinn (2008) argues that the efforts made by 
abating countries (such as countries signatory to the 2005 Kyoto protocol) to curb carbon 
emissions only reduce the discounted value of carbon price in the future more than the present, 
incentivizing resource owners to bring forward the extraction of their resources as a result of the 
anticipated price cut. He cautions that until demand reducing measures are matched by supply 
reducing ones, efforts to mitigate greenhouse effects will amount to little. 
Like Sinn (2008), Green and Denniss (2018) admonish that policymakers ought to augment 
demand-side policies with supply-side policies to achieve greater efficiency. The authors explain 
that restrictive supply-side policies, such as fossil fuel subsidy reduction, fossil fuel supply tax or 
 
7 For more thorough discussion, see the first systematic analysis by Barnett & Morse (1963);  as well as Livernois 
(2009); and Gaudet (2007). 
8 See also Kunzig & Broecker (2008); Sinclair(1992); Nordhaus (1991); IPCC (1997); Stern & Stern, (2007), etc. 
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ban/moratorium, and fossil fuel production quotas, have lower monitoring, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) cost. They contend that unlike demand instruments that require detailed and 
complex regulatory institutions for MRV, restrictive supply policies target a relatively slim 
market of upstream fossil fuel providers whose output (especially coal and oil) are easy to 
measure and capture a wider coverage including downstream consumers. They add that in 
addition to the economic benefits associated with supply-side policies, they also result in 
political benefits such as greater public support, higher perceived benefits, higher perceived 
distributional fairness, and lower perceived costs. 
Responding to the supply-side policies, several countries have encouraged the substitution 
away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy by promoting biofuel production via tax 
exemptions and subsidies. Although renewable energy sources such as biofuels are low on 
carbon emissions and solar and wind do not contribute to emissions (beyond those required for 
mill and panel production), they may in some instances generate perverse outcomes that 
contradict the objectives which justify their use. Grafton et al. (2012) theoretically show that 
renewable energy subsidies may lead to a green paradox. Given the assumptions that the 
renewable resource is produced under increasing marginal cost and both types of fuels are 
supplied in the market, they show that subsidies for the renewable energy result in a direct and 
indirect effect that oppose each other. A subsidy for the renewable substitute reduces the 
production cost and makes the substitute relatively cheaper leading to a reduction in the demand 
for fossil fuels, thus, a direct effect. The indirect effect is the increase in the demand for fossil 
fuels that arise from the reduction in the equilibrium price for fossil fuel. The net effect will 
depend on the curvature of the demand curve for energy and the supply curve for biofuels. 
Theoretically, van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012) also show that subsidizing clean and 
expensive backstop technologies such as solar and wind energy leads to a rapid depletion of 
fossil fuels which results in greater climate change damages. Similarly, Gerlagh (2011) analyses 
how different assumptions underlying the extraction cost of fossil energy and a backstop 
technology affect the green paradox. He distinguishes between a weak and a strong green 
paradox. A weak green paradox occurs when biofuel production promotes greater fossil fuel 
extraction whereas a strong green paradox occurs when clean energy technology increases the 
net carbon emissions. In his first model, he assumes a fixed resource with a constant extraction 
cost and a perfect backstop technology. In the two remaining models, extraction cost is assumed 
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to increase but the backstop in model 2 is assumed to be a perfect substitute whereas model 3 
relaxes the perfect substitute assumption. The green paradox is stronger in the first model and 
erodes step by step through to third model. 
The implication of the result by Gerlagh (2011) is similar to that of van der Ploeg & 
Withagen (2012) and Fischer & Salant (2012) who suggest that, in the absence of a carbon tax, a 
strong green paradox can be avoided if subsidies for clean backstop technology are sufficiently 
high enough to make the cost of clean energy lower than the extraction cost of fossil fuels. 
Strand (2007) considers the adverse effects of a “technology treaty” that is signed in the 
absence of other measures as carbon taxes or quotas. The author introduces uncertainty regarding 
the discovery of a clean backstop technology after a treaty is signed and assumes that the 
marginal cost of the backstop technology is lower than the extraction cost of fossil fuels. The 
model results show two opposing effects which the author classifies as the immediate extraction 
and the extraction-moderating effects. The immediate extraction effect which results in a (weak) 
green paradox occurs when a “technology treaty” increases the probability of the resource (fossil 
fuels) becoming redundant, causing producers of fossil fuels to increase extraction more rapidly 
leading to greater carbon emission. On the other hand, the extraction-moderating effect occurs as 
the positive rate of developing and adopting clean technology displaces fossil fuels use and 
reduces expected emissions. 
Grafton et al. (2014) further developed the analysis by showing using US energy data that 
substituting cheaper low carbon energy for fossil fuels results in a green paradox. Like Gerlagh 
(2011) and Grafton et al. (2012), they decompose the total effect into a weak and a strong green 
paradox. They establish the existence of both a weak and a strong green paradox. Specifically, 
they find that (1) a 1% rise in US biofuel production increases US fossil fuels production by 
0.04% (weak green paradox) and (2), a strong green paradox occurs if CO2 emission reduction 
based on a one-for-one substitution of biofuels for fossil use is below 26% in the short-run and 
57% in the long-run. The result implies that incentivizing the production of biofuels and to a 
larger extent renewable energy through the provision of subsidies lead to greater environmental 
damages (a green paradox). This occurs since fossil fuel suppliers anticipating a future increase 
in the production of alternative energy increases current extraction, leading to a front-loading of 
GHG emissions. 
Before the implementation of most of these environmental policies especially a carbon tax, 
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they are pre-announced to give economic agents time to adapt to the policy change. Di Maria et 
al. (2012) document evidence of environmental policies that have significant unavoidable time 
lags and outline reasons for their occurrence. Evidence shows that the existence of an 
implementation lag in some major environmental policies such as the US Clean Air Act 
Amendments affected emissions. For instance, Di Maria et al. (2012) show using analytical 
models that implementation lags embedded in Title IV of the 1990 US Clean Air Act 
Amendments affect the rate of emissions. In addition to their theoretical predictions, their 
empirical findings reinforce the adverse effect arising from implementation lags. Their findings 
reveal that, in the absence of implementation lags, sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions associated 
with coal-fired power plants in the US would have been 9% less than actual emissions. 
Following these results, Di Maria et al. (2014) provide a more detailed empirical test of the 
green paradox hypothesis by focusing on the Acid Rain Program. The authors examine the price 
and use (demand) effects of a cap on the allowable volume of SO2 emissions that are announced 
in time ! = 0 but implemented in a later period. The announcement of a future ceiling on SO2 
emissions following the passing into law of the 1990 CAAA9 generates two broad outcomes 
resulting from the supply shift. First, there is a resulting price reduction in coal. Second, no 
evidence for a quantity response (increase in the sulfur content of coal) following the reduction 
in coal prices was found. However, by considering procurement strategies, they found evidence 
of a green paradox among a subgroup of power plants that rely largely on the spot market. The 
mixed results provide little evidence for the existence of the green paradox. 
On the other hand, Lemoine (2017) found evidence for the green paradox resulting from the 
breakdown of the carbon cap and trade legislation in the U.S Senate in 2010. The author reports 
that, contrary to the proposed aim of the legislation, carbon emissions increased by over 12 
million tons between the period discussions on the legislation commenced and the time the 
legislation was defeated. He reports that, even before the collapse of the bill, expectations of a 
possible future cap had already been formed leading to a drop in the prices of coal and natural 
gas. 
Like the preceding studies, Smulders, Tsur, & Zemel (2012) employ a closed-economy 
 
9 The Act “seeks to protect human health and the environment from emissions that pollute ambient, or outdoor, air. 
It requires EPA to establish minimum national standards for air quality, and assigns primary responsibility to the 
states to assure compliance with the standards”(CRS 2020).  
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continuous-time model to study the effect of a pre-announced carbon tax. However, they deviate 
from the assumption of fossil energy scarcity and show that a carbon tax policy announced in 
advance results in unintended consequences in the interim as consumers smooth their 
consumption path by increasing early investment in fossil energy and increasing emissions, 
which is contrary to the intended purpose of the announced policy. The authors show that 
households respond to a future reduction in fossil energy production and use by reducing 
consumption and increasing savings in the interim phase to invest in capital. This consumption 
smoothing motive gives rise to the build-up of larger capital stock, and since capital and energy 
are complements, the announcement of the carbon tax instead increases emissions during the 
interim phase. 
According to Smulders, Tsur, & Zemel (2012), the adverse unintended effect is identical 
whether the implementation time is known with certainty or not. They again show that a green 
paradox occurs whether a high tax rate that is capable of altering the behavior of resource users 
toward the use of solar energy or a mild tax rate that does not induce a switch from polluting 
(fossil fuels) to clean energy sources (solar) is set. However, they note that the key driver of the 
interim behavioral change before the implementation of the carbon policy is not the carbon tax in 
particular but rather the anticipated reduction in fossil energy use. Similar to the announcement 
effects, Strand (2007) shows using simulations that a “technology treaty” favoring clean 
technology signed at a period in time and adopted at a later period at all times increases 
cumulative extraction. 
A declining price of a substitute for fossil fuels and the presence of an implementation lag 
related to environmental policies are not the only possible causes of a green paradox but also the 
time profile of a carbon tax. The imposition of a carbon tax is largely used by countries as an 
alternative policy measure, and sometimes as a complementary policy to clean energy subsidies 
to increase the price of fossil fuels and encourage the switch to renewable energy and ultimately 
reduce emissions. However, the imposition of a carbon tax does not automatically guarantee a 
reduction in emissions, as emissions may increase if the tax is not optimally designed.10 It is 
therefore important to design an optimal tax that is aimed at encouraging a switch to “green” 
technologies to enjoy the full benefits of these complementary policies. 
 
10 For more insight on the optimal design of carbon taxes see also Chakrovorty et al. (2006), Tahvonen (1997) and, 
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996). 
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Hoel (2010) demonstrates that given reasonable assumptions on expectation formation, a 
higher present carbon tax will achieve the intended effect of reducing present carbon emissions. 
However, the author argues that a rapidly rising carbon tax may result in a green paradox as 
resource owners shift the extraction path to the present thereby increasing near-term emissions. 
Sinn (2008) makes a similar observation by stating that a sufficiently rising carbon tax only 
induces resource owners to sacrifice future extraction for the present, leading to a green paradox. 
Ulph & Ulph, (1994) also show numerically that the optimal emission tax is not a continuous 
upward rising curve but an inverted U-shaped curve. They show that an initial upward rising 
emission tax followed by an eventual fall is more effective in reducing the extraction rates of 
fossil fuels, contrary to the argument advanced by Sinclair (1992) for a falling ad valorem carbon 
tax. 
For the United States, Davis and Kilian (2011) found that a 10% rise in carbon tax reduces 
carbon emissions from vehicles by 1.5%. Andersson (2019) found a much higher carbon tax 
elasticity for Sweden. His result showed that following a 1% rise in the carbon tax, carbon 
emissions from transport reduced by 11% and the carbon tax elasticity of gasoline demand is 
three times the price elasticity. Rivers and Schaufele (2015) showed that a carbon tax in the 
Canadian province of British Columbia yields a large consumer response to demand than market 
price movements. Over the first four years of British Columbia’s carbon policy, carbon emissions 
from gasoline consumption in the province reduced by 2.4 MT of CO2 equivalent. On the 
contrary, Pretis (2019) showed that British Columbia’s carbon tax “has not ‘yet’ led to a 
statistically significant reduction in aggregate CO2 emissions” 
While these results provide evidence for the effectiveness of a carbon tax, Andersson (2019) 
advises that estimating the effect of a carbon tax on changes in demand for gasoline must be 
done with caution. He asserts that unlike the United States and Canada, in Europe, diesel is used 
as engine fuels for most passenger vehicles. Therefore, failing to draw a clear distinction 
between the effect of a carbon tax on all forms of fossil fuels and gasoline alone may result in 
estimation problems. He identifies shortfalls in the studies by Rivers and Schaufele (2015) and 
Davis and Kilian (2011), as they fail to account for substitution between fuels as well as the 
different modes of transport. 
As the literature review has shown thus far, a green paradox may occur under different policy 
scenarios and assumptions. Different policy measures have been adopted to reduce carbon 
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emission. However, none of these policy approaches has adequately resolved the world’s greatest 
public good problem. Subsidies to alternative energy sources, pre-announced climate policies, 
and carbon taxes sub-optimally designed can alter the extraction path of fossil fuels, shifting 
emissions to the present. Although there have been numerous policy approaches, empirically, 
there is limited research attempting to provide evidence for the existence of a green paradox.  
Researching the green paradox will require long consumption, production, and emissions data on 
fuels that are mostly scarce or unavailable. Consequently, a number of these studies (as outlined 
in the review) have adopted the use of analytical models and simulation approaches to show 
when the green paradox occurs in theory under different climate policy scenarios. This study 
bridges the gap in the literature by using long Brazilian fuel data to provide an empirical test 
rooted in previously developed theory. 
2.2 The effect of an incentive for ethanol on the supply of oil 
After Sinn (2008) spurred the green paradox debate and advocated that climate policies must not 
only look at the demand but also incorporate the supply-side, some stakeholders (such as the 
IPCC, governments, and researchers) are now giving at least as much weight to the supply side 
as to the demand side of the market. Several polices ranging from subsidies for clean technology 
and its development to blending mandates have been adopted by policymakers. For instance, in 
Brazil, the ProAlcool program provides several incentive packages to sugarcane farmers, ethanol 
producers, and consumers that encourage the substitution away from fossil fuels towards 
biofuels.  
In this section, we develop a theoretical model by first assuming a general supply function 
for oil which is obtained from the profit maximization problem of oil producers. We further 
assume that oil and ethanol are both supplied in a competitive market—consumers have adequate 
information and can compare the relative prices of oil and ethanol before making their 
purchasing decision. We specify our supply function as $! = %('" , '#!, '$ , )"), where $! and 
'" are the supply and price of oil, '$ captures the price of other non-ethanol substitutes for oil 
such as coal and natural gas and )" represents the input price of oil producers. The supply 
function for oil is upward sloping, thus, +%/+'" > 0. We allow oil supply to be influenced by 
any incentive provided for alternative cleaner fuels such as subsidies for ethanol through a price 
mechanism indicated by '#!. Thus, '#! is the price of ethanol that incorporates the subsidy for 
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ethanol producers, implying that '#! = .('# , Γ). We define '# as the price of ethanol without an 
incentive and Γ as a supply induced incentive for ethanol such as a subsidy. The supply function 
is now specified as $! = %('" , '#!('# , Γ), '$ , )"). 
 On the demand side, we assume a given demand which is a function of output prices and 
income and is specified as $% = 0('" , '# , '$ , 1, 2). $% is the demand for oil with a slope 
+0/+'" < 0, i.e. a downward slopping demand curve, 1, and 2 represent the price of 
consumers’ composite commodities11 and income respectively. All other variables remain as 
already defined. For simplicity, we normalize the price of the composite commodity to one. The 
demand function reduces to $% = 0('" , '# , '$ , 2). 
 Using the equilibrium condition $% = $! = 	0('" , '# , '$ , 2) = 	%('" , '#!('# , Γ), '$ , )") 
we redefine '" so that it is implicitly defined by the equilibrium condition. '"will adjust to 
ensure that the equilibrium condition is satisfied, and it will be a function of only exogenous 
parameters, i.e. '#, '$,	)", Γ, and 2. Thus, the equation defines the equilibrium oil price as a 
function of the price of ethanol, the price of other substitutes, input price of oil, an ethanol 
subsidy and income. In other words, we obtain an implicit equilibrium price expressed as '" =
'"('# , '$ , )" , Γ, Y).  
The equilibrium quantity ($) obtained from the equilibrium condition after incorporating 
equilibrium price is 
$ = 		0['"('# , '$ , )" , Γ, Y), '# , '$ , 2] = 	%['"('# , '$ , )" , Γ, Y), '#!('# , Γ), '$ , )"]. 
The resulting equilibrium quantity for oil implies that an ethanol subsidy has multiple 
effects. Thus, aside from its direct effect on both demand and supply, it indirectly influences 
supply and demand through its influence on the equilibrium price.  
 Since 0 ≡ %, and the objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of ethanol production 
(triggered by an ethanol subsidy) on the supply of oil, we restrict our computation to the 
equilibrium quantity obtained from the supply function. The total derivative of the function 
yields the outcome 
 
11 Based on the composite commodity theorem, any group of goods whose prices move together can be treated as a 
single commodity. This makes it conveniently to examine one specific good and its relationship to “all the other 
goods”. In this specific case, we capture the price of “all the other goods” except oil, ethanol and non-ethanol 
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To appropriately sign the effect of  Γ on the equilibrium quantity of oil (i.e. 9$/9Γ), we 
further compute for  9'"/9Γ to establish the relationship between Γ and '". If we let the 
function . be defined as the left-hand side of % − 0 ≡ 0 in equilibrium, the implicit function 

















































We can sign the effect of Γ on the equilibrium price of oil using primitive assumptions, i.e. 
the assumed nature of the supply and demand functions (along with the relationship between '#!, 
'" and Γ). However, we find it helpful to express the comparative static in elasticity form, which 



























































Since ethanol and oil in Brazil are regarded as substitutes, we expect a negative cross-price 
elasticity between oil supply and ethanol price, thus, B!,'"# < 0. Under the Hotelling rule, 
forward-looking oil owners alter their extraction behavior by bringing their extraction path 
forward following the implementation of policies that threaten their future resource-derived 
revenues. Therefore, the implementation of an ethanol subsidy that threatens the future 
profitability of oil producers will cause them to increase current extraction, putting downward 
pressure on oil prices. Grafton, Kompas and Long (2012) further show that an ethanol subsidy 
will lower not only the price of oil but also the price of ethanol at each point in time, hence, a 
negative cross-price elasticity between ethanol subsidy and price of ethanol (i.e. B'"#,( < 0). 
From our earlier assumption of the curvature of the demand and supply curves, own-price 
elasticity of supply (B!,'$) and own-price elasticity of demand (B%,'$) are given as positive and 
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(2.4) 
where the term F = (B!,'"# × B'"#,()/(B!,'$ − B%,'$) > 0.  
From Equation 2.4, we can observe that two scenarios arise depending on the relative 
magnitudes of B'!,( and the F term. If B'!,( is greater than F we have 9'"/9Γ > 0, otherwise it 
is negative. This implies that, we cannot provide a specific sign for 9'"/9Γ unless we assume at 
a point in time one of the two scenarios mentioned above. 
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Again, for easier interpretation, we express the comparative static in elasticity form by 
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(2.5) 
As already established, B!,'$ is positive and B!,'"# 	, B'!,(	and B'"#,( are negative. Also, since 
supply and ethanol subsidy assume positive values, $/Γ is positive. Our analysis, therefore, 
indicates that the effect of an ethanol subsidy on oil supply depends on the relative magnitudes of 
B!,'$H−B'!,( − FI	KL9	B!,'"# × B'"#,( in Equation 2.5. Since we know with certainty that the 
product of  B!,'"# and B'"#,( yields a positive outcome (the two terms are defined earlier as 
negative), the effect of an ethanol subsidy on oil supply will largely depends on the relative 
magnitudes of B'!,( and F. If B'!,( outweighs F, then 9$/9Γ > 0. This scenario implies that an 
ethanol subsidy will have a positive effect on the amount of oil extracted, thus evidence of a 
weak green paradox. 
However, if this condition does not hold (thus, B'!,( < F), then an ethanol subsidy could 
result in two possible outcomes depending on the relative magnitudes of B!,'$H−B'!,( − FI and 
B!,'"#B'"#,(. Like before, a weak green paradox occurs if the negative effect (B!,'$H−B'!,( − FI) 
is outweighed by the positive effect (B!,'"#B'"#,(), otherwise a weak green paradox does not 
occur. 
A very relevant aspect of this analysis is understanding the factors that may influence the 
various elasticity values. In other words, the factors that may affect the magnitudes of the two 
effects causing the curves to be flat and/or steep relative to each other.  
The degree of price elasticity of supply is explained among other factors by the spare 
production capacity, time horizon, and change in per-unit costs with increased production. For 
instance, when oil producers have enough spare production capacity to operate with, they can 
easily adjust to oil price hikes by expanding production. Similarly, a longer time horizon (long-
run) or lower per-unit costs associated with expanding production will result in a relatively flatter 
supply curve, implying that a change in the price of oil will result in a more than proportionate 
change in the quantity of oil supply to the market. However, immediately after a price increase, 
producers can expand output using their current capacity making own price elasticity of supply 
inelastic. Similarly, when producers have little spare production capacity or when the per-unit 
costs associated with increased production is high, the less responsive they can be.  
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Additionally, the degree of elasticity between ethanol subsidy and the price of ethanol is 
determined by price controls. In some countries, energy prices are regulated by complex price 
control mechanisms (such as establishing price floors and ceilings) such that a sufficiently high 
incentive for ethanol producers (leading to lower production cost) may not translate to price 
reduction due to the institution of price controls. However, if there exists a flexible price control 
system that adequately adjusts prices to reflect production cost, then the degree of elasticity 
between an ethanol subsidy and the price of ethanol will be elastic. Also, when producers have 
enough market power to influence prices (such as an oligopoly market or the case where ethanol 
producers form cartels), an ethanol subsidy may not lead to the expected reduction in ethanol 
prices. Given such circumstances, the oligopoly producers or cartels can manipulate the market 
price and charge a relatively higher market price, hence an inelastic elasticity between an ethanol 
subsidy and ethanol price. 
In the Brazilian context, Petrobras’ monopoly power can influence the degree of elasticity of 
supply. With 15 out of 17 refineries constituting over 90% of domestic refining capacity, all 
things being equal, Petrobras can respond quickly to oil price hikes by increasing production to 
meet the market demand. The large production capacity of Petrobras gives it the advantage of 
swiftly responding to changes in oil prices. Also, the per-unit cost associated with increased 
production would be lower for Petrobras relative to other private oil companies operating within 
the region considering the huge infrastructural investments Petrobras has made over the years 
and the governmental support it receives. These factors will cause the supply curve facing 
Petrobras to be relatively flat, implying that a more than proportionate quantity response will 
follow a change in oil price. 
By implication, the full effects of an ethanol subsidy may not be observed as a result of 
Petrobras’ market power. As already mentioned, an ethanol subsidy is expected to influence not 
only the ethanol market but also the oil market. The mechanism that will result in behavioral 
change in the oil sector as a result of the implementation of an ethanol subsidy is the rent-seeking 
behavior of oil producers. Under the hotelling rule, oil producers respond to an ethanol subsidy 
when they anticipate a threat to their future profitability. However, Petrobras’ market power 
provides security towards its future profitability and as a result, it can deviate from hotelling 
rent-seeking behavior by not responding (or may respond marginally) to oil price hikes and 
curtail the full effect of an ethanol subsidy on the production of oil. 
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3.1 Data 
To empirically analyze the effect of Brazilian biofuels policy of promoting the production of 
ethanol on the rate of extraction of oil and emissions, we employ annual data from Brazil over 
the period 1981 to 2018. The choice of duration is primarily due to the availability of data points 
for all variables used in this study. Energy data is obtained from the BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy and includes oil production and production of natural gas.12 The outcome 
variable—oil production—is measured in MT and includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands, 
condensates (both lease condensate and gas plant condensate), and NGLs (natural gas liquids—
ethane, LPG and naphtha separated from the production of natural gas). 
Natural gas excludes gas that has been flared or recycled. However, it includes natural gas 
produced for gas-to-liquids transformation and it is measured in millions of tonnes of oil 
equivalent. Data for ethanol production is collected from UNICA, and is measured in thousand 
cubic meters and includes hydrous and anhydrous ethanol. The Brent dated oil prices are 
measured in 2018 U.S dollars per barrel. Like the energy data, oil prices and emissions data are 
all collected from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. All analyses are performed using 
Stata statistical software package version 14.0. 
3.2 Description of Data 
As shown in Table 3.1, the energy data for this study spans the period 1981 to 2018, generating 
38 observations for each variable. Oil production accounts for the greatest share in the Brazilian 
energy mix with a mean of approximately 69 MT and a standard deviation of 40. The global 
annual crude oil price recorded a minimum of $20 and a maximum of $124 with an average of 
$59 per barrel in nominal terms. The standard deviation value of 31 indicates the variability in 
 
12 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019 provides historical data on world energy markets. 
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crude oil prices over the period. Ethanol production averaged 16,730 thousand cubic meters with 
a maximum production level of 33,103 thousand cubic meters which was recorded in 2018.  
We further obtain annual time series data on national-level CO2 emissions from BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy and International Energy Statistics from 1965 to 2018. The 
carbon emissions data reflect emissions from fuel only (thus, the consumption of oil, gas, and 
coal for combustion-related activities), and are based on “Default CO2 Emissions Factors for 
Combustion” listed by the IPCC in its Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
(2006). These guidelines do not allow for any carbon that is sequestered or carbon emitted from 
other sources, or for emissions of other GHGs. Emissions are measured in Million tonnes CO2. 
 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
 Variable Obs. Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oil production 38 Mt 69 40 12 142  
Ethanol production 38 M3 16730 7639 4241 33103 
Gas production 38 Mtoe 9 7 0.8 23 
Crude oil prices 38 US$ 59 31 20 124 
3.3 The Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) 
The empirical study is based on the vector autoregressive model (VAR). VARs are considered to 
be a suitable class of models to model the dynamics of a set of endogenous time series variables. 
VARs have been used primarily in macroeconomics and are often suitable in situations when 
variables are stationary at levels or integrated of order one (I(1)) and are not cointegrated 
(Greene, 2005). The model estimates a system of equations (a seemingly unrelated regression 
model with identical regressors) that include lagged values of both the dependent and 
independent variables. When a VAR model is correctly specified (thus, the variables included 
are stationary) it produces the Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE). 
VARs have proven to be more efficient in “analyzing and forecasting macroeconomic 
activity and tracing the effects of policy changes and external stimuli on the economy” than 
large-scale structural equation systems (Greene, 2005). Aside from forecasting, VARs are also 
employed in testing Granger causality and studying policy effects through impulse response 
functions. However, a major disadvantage of VARs is the high number of parameters. 
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Several tests are conducted to obtain the appropriate VAR structure for this study. First, the 
VAR model requires the determination of the optimal lag length. The Schwarz Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) indicates that the optimal lag length is one (Table 3.2). For 
completeness, we follow Grafton et al., (2014) and include longer lags of explanatory variables 
based on the Akaike Information (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criteria (HQIC) and 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) information criteria. The primary reason for this test is to choose between 
models (i.e. models with longer or shorter lags of explanatory variables). However, all extra lags 
were found to be insignificant and as a result, the model with a one-year lag as predicted by 
SBIC is reported. 
Table 3.2. Selection of optimal lag length 
 Information Criteria 
Lag Df P LR AIC HQIC SBIC 
0    38.785 38.908 39.144 
1 16 0.000 168.13 34.781 35.149 35.859* 
2 16 0.000 50.222 34.245 34.858 36.041 
3 16 0.000 55.324 33.559 34.417 36.073 
4 16 0.000 44.393* 33.195* 34.297* 36.427 
An asterisk (*) implies the optimal lag length chosen by the information criterion 
To decide whether to include a deterministic trend or not in the model, we graph both the 
level and differenced series and the outcome is presented in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1. Time series graph 
Note: The upper panel represents the graph for the level variables and the lower panel is the graph for the 
differenced series. 
The visual inspection of the time series graph indicates that all variables (at levels) exhibit an 
upward trend. However, the differenced data takes away the trend in the series. Based on these 
outcomes, a VAR model without a deterministic trend is specified (Equation 3.1) to (Equation 
3.4) and estimated (Table 4.1). 
Before running a causality test in time series analysis, it is germane to estimate the order of 
integration and stationarity conditions of all variables. A stationary time series is one whose 
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presence of unit root), the regression outcome will most likely be spurious. For this purpose, we 
perform the test for stationarity using the conventional ADF test, the Dickey-Fuller generalized 
least square (DF-GLS) proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) and the Phillips-Perron test following 
Phillips and Perron (1988). The different approaches are adopted since there are no uniformly 
most powerful stationarity tests. Although the ADF test has been widely used in most studies, 
Elliott et al. (1996) showed that the test has low power compared to the DF-GLS. For 
completeness, we use three common unit root test approaches. The maximum lag selected by the 
Schwert criterion in the DF-GLS test is 9 and results for the three different tests are presented in 
Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3. ADF, DF-GLS, and Phillips-Perron tests for unit root 
Variables  ADF test  DF-GLS test  PP test 
 SBIC lag t-Stat 5% CV  SC lag t-Stat 5% CV  z(t) 5% CV 
Panel A: Variables at levels (Including Trend) 
Oil production 1 -1.91 -3.556  1 -1.52 -3.190  -1.58 -3.552 
Ethanol production 1 -1.94 -3.556  1 -1.99 -3.190  -1.90 -3.552 
Gas production 1 -0.67 -3.556  1 -0.52 -3.190  -1.23 -3.552 
Crude oil prices 1 -2.51 -3.556  1 -1.61 -3.190  -2.53 -3.552 
Panel B: Variables in the first difference (No Trend) 
∆Oil production 0 -4.33 -3.675  1 -3.92 -3.190  -4.19 -3.556 
∆Ethanol production 0 -5.20 -3.675  1 -3.60 -3.190  -5.04 -3.556 
∆Gas production 0 -6.63 -3.675  1 -3.04 -3.190a  -7.51 -3.556 
∆Crude oil prices 0 -5.42 -3.675  1 -3.63 -3.190  -5.40 -3.556 
a Gas production becomes stationary at a 10% critical level (-2.890) as such this value is interpreted to be stationary at 
first difference. 
The outcomes of the unit root tests are similar across the different approaches. In all tests, 
each variable is non-stationary at levels, implying the presence of a unit root. The first difference 
of the variables leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% significance 
level except for natural gas where the null is rejected at a 10% level with the DF-GLS test. Based 
on these results, we conclude that all variables are integrated of order one. 
In this specific event that all variables are I(1), time series analysis requires the test for the 
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presence of cointegrating relationships among variables. This test informs the existence of a 
long-run cointegrating relationship. It is significant because it allows for the testing of plausible 
economic relationships among non-stationary time series variables, under the assumption of 
long-run equilibrium. We employ the Johansen approach in conducting the cointegration test. 
Since most of the series have been established to have a trending behavior (see Figure 3.1), a 
linear trend term is included in the cointegration test specification. The lag order of the VAR 
which is behind the cointegration test analysis is based on the order chosen according to the 
SBIC. We select the lag order based on SBIC because of problems linked with explosive impulse 
response functions associated with longer orders (Cologni and Manera, 2008). Again, a priori, 
we do not expect a significant relationship between energy variables that goes “too far” back 
(confirmed in the model selection test). 
Table 3.4. Johansen cointegration test 
H0: H1: Trace Test ! −max Test 
 
Rank = 	% 
 










0 0 35.091* 54.64  – 19.0377 30.33 – 
1 1 16.054 34.55 0.40222 9.5648 23.78 0.40222 
2 2 6.489 18.17 0.22780 3.9113 16.87 0.22780 
3 3 2.577 3.74 0.10032  2.5774 3.74 0.10032  
4 4   0.06729   0.06729 
An asterisk (*) implies the significance of the test statistics at 5% significance level. 
Table 3.4 provides evidence of no long-run relationship among the variables. We, therefore, 
impose no cointegrating restriction and estimate a VAR with the variables entering the first 
difference. The VAR models specified in equations 3.1 to 3.4 include the following four 
variables: oil production, ethanol production, gas production, and oil prices. For equation 3.1, we 
present results for two models: a model that includes a constant and another that suppresses the 
constant term.13 The model with a suppressed constant—thus, Regression Through the Origin 
(RTO)—is included to directly predict changes in oil as a linear function of changes in the other 
regressors, without reference to the current levels of the variables. Thus, by this, we assume that 
 
13 For simplicity we only specify the equations with constants. 
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oil production will remain unchanged, on average, if the price of oil and productivity level of the 
other forms of energy are unchanged. The estimation results are presented in Table 4.1 in 
Chapter 4. 
























































All variables are as previously defined in the data section. The parameters Q* to Q4 and _*) to 
_4) represent constants and residuals in each equation. The optimal lag length is represented as `. 
S, T, X and [ are the short-run dynamic coefficients to be estimated and ∆ represents the first 
difference operator. We emphasize that because one of the primary objectives of this study is to 
ascertain the influence of ethanol production on the rate of oil extraction, Equation 3.1 is the 
primary focus among the systems of equations, and as such results are only explained for the 
equation of interest. However, the results for Equation 3.2 to Equation 3.4 are provided in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. 
To further understand how oil production responds to exogenous shocks, we conduct an 
impulse response analysis. An impulse response captures the reaction of a dynamic system to an 
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exogenous change. The response function provides the time profile of the effect of an external 
change that occurs at a given time on the expected values of variables in a dynamic system 
(Koop, Pesaran, and Potter, 1996). We specifically focus on the response of oil production to a 
one standard deviation shock in ethanol production. The results are presented in Figure 4.1 in the 
succeeding chapter. 
To achieve the second objective of this study—whether or not there is evidence for a strong 
green paradox—we follow Grafton et al. (2014) and evaluate the net effect of a one-for-one 
substitution of ethanol for oil on CO2. We conduct our evaluation based on the proportional 
increase in oil production resulting from a one percent rise in ethanol production given the 2018 
production values for oil and ethanol. We specify based on our results from Table 4.1 that a one 
percent rise in Brazil’s change in ethanol production in period a will result in a 1.5 and 4.914 
percentage increase in the change in oil production in the short-run and long-run, respectively15. 
To standardize the units of measurement of the energy and emission variables, we use the 
approximate conversion factors adopted from the 2019 report of BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy. The conversion factors employed are: 1 metric tonne equals 7.33 barrels; 1 meter cube 
equals 6.3 barrels of oil; 1 tonne of CO2 equals 1.10231 US ton of CO2. Table 4.2 presents the 
results for the effect of Brazil’s ethanol production on CO2 emissions. 
 
14 The computation for the short-run and long-run elasticity values can be found in Equation A.5 and Equation A.7 in 
the Appendix.   
15 We define the short-run as the time period over which oil producers cannot easily switch from the production of 
oil to the production of ethanol. However, in the long-run—thus, a period of time fairly long for oil producers to 
channel their resource into the production of oil—the marginal cost of producing oil is higher than that of ethanol. 
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The green paradox theory predicts that renewable energy policies aimed at encouraging the 
substitution away from fossil fuels may increase the incentive for fossil-fuel producers to 
increase their current rate of extraction, accentuating climate change damages. Renewable 
energy policies such as biofuel subsidies may pose a threat to the future profitability of fossil-
fuel owners resulting in a behavioral change (thus, extracting more now rather than later). The 
effects of the behavioral change of fossil-fuel owners can be observed through an increase in the 
rate of fossil extraction and consequently an increase in carbon emissions. The increase in the 
rate of fossil extraction as a result of the direct effect of a renewable energy policy is classified as 
a weak green paradox in this study. A strong green paradox occurs when the overall CO2 
emissions in Brazil increase due to renewable energy policy. 
In this study, we examine the effectiveness of Brazil’s renewable energy policy by observing 
changes in the level of production. Since one of the principal objectives of renewable energy 
policies such as biofuel subsidies, wind, and solar energy is to provide energy with fewer 
emissions, it is important to examine the effectiveness of such policies on production. For 
instance, Grafton et al. (2014) found that the biofuel subsidy program of the United States 
government played a very significant role in the expansion of biofuel production in the US. They 
observed a correlation of 0.9978 between US biofuel subsidies and biofuel production and 
further used biofuel production instead of biofuel subsidies as their explanatory variable due to 
data challenges. We follow Grafton et al. (2014) and employ ethanol production as a proxy for 
renewable energy policy in this study. 
Since Brazil has encouraged not only the production but also the consumption of ethanol 
through several measures prescribed by the ProAlcool program, the effect of such a program can 
be observed in the level of production. As already recounted in the section titled Brazil’s Ethanol 
Experience, some of the measures adopted by Brazil to promote ethanol production range from 
the use of subsidies and blending mandates to general industry support in the form of public 
research investment. 
Although we do not restrict our attention to a single policy measure (such as an ethanol 
Chapter 4 – 
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subsidy or a tax incentive) and trace out its effect on the rate of oil extraction, we consider the 
effect of increased ethanol production on the rate of extraction. The level of ethanol production 
more generally captures the various policy measures aimed at promoting its production. For 
instance, large-scale financial incentives to ethanol producers are expected to have an implication 
on the level of ethanol production, providing a direct relationship between such an incentive and 
production. Again, a very good reference point is the work of Grafton et al. (2014). 
Based on this premise, the main testable hypothesis that satisfies the first objective of this 
study is that oil producers in Brazil respond to an expansion in ethanol production by increasing 
the rate of oil extraction. Evidence of such a relationship would provide support for a weak green 
paradox.  
The VAR results from the first equation of our VAR model (Equation 3.1) testing for the 
existence of a weak green paradox is presented in Table 4.1. We examine a model that has 
change in oil production in the current period as the dependent variable regressed on a one-
period lagged change in oil and ethanol productions, one-period lagged change in natural gas, 
and one-period lagged change in the price of oil. We present results for two models: models with 
and without a constant.  
The results from the regressions reveal a positive relationship between the one-period lagged 
change in oil production and the current period’s change in oil production. An MT increase in the 
last period’s change in oil production will lead to a 0.268 MT (Column 1) and 0.522 MT 
(Column 2) rise in the current period’s change in oil production. This is significant at the ten 
percent significance level and implies that future oil supply decisions are influenced by current 
production.  
The estimated coefficient of ethanol production is positive and statistically significant at the 
ten-percent significance level (Column 1). The results indicate that a change in Brazil’s ethanol 
production from one period ago influences the change in oil production in the current period. 
Specifically, a cubic meter (m3) rise in the change in Brazil’s ethanol production in the previous 
period would result in a 0.53 m3 (0.000530 MT) to 0.64 m3 (0.000639 MT) increase in the 
change in oil production in the current period. The computed short-run and long-run elasticities 
of the change in oil production with respect to a change in ethanol production are 1.5 and 4.9, 
respectively. These elasticity values imply that a 1 percent increase in the change in ethanol 
production would increase the change in oil production by 1.5 percent in the short-run and 4.9 
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percent in the long-run. The results provide evidence for the existence of a weak green paradox 
for Brazil, although at a low level of significance. Thus, an expansion in ethanol production is 
associated with greater oil production over the time frame we study. 
It is possible, however, that the seemingly small coefficient for Brazil’s oil production with 
respect to ethanol production could be as a result of the strong involvement of the state in the oil 
sector. Brazil is home to 17 refineries, out of which Petrobras—the national oil company 
operates 15. Brazil’s downstream oil industry is largely controlled by Petrobras, whose facilities 
represent more than 90% of domestic refining capacity. However, Brazil opened the oil sector to 
other companies after amending the 1995 constitution and ended the monopoly reign of 
Petrobras. Also, the introduction of Concession Bidding Rounds and the amendment of the 
Production Sharing Law that empowered Petrobras to solely operate the Pre-Salt area opened the 
possibility for other companies to operate in the Pre-Salt.16 The constitutional amendments and 
Petrobras’ decision to encourage the divestment of both upstream and downstream assets have 
“created unprecedented opportunities for other companies” (Oddone 2016).17 
The de-facto monopoly power of Petrobras and largely the state in the sector could hamper 
the full effect of an upsurge in ethanol production on the rate of oil extraction. The state 
(Petrobras) can afford to deviate from rent-seeking behavior and provide minimal to no quantity 
response in the face of increasing ethanol production. Nonetheless, there could be a quantity 
response from other private companies whose extraction decisions are motivated by profit. The 
evidence from Table 4.1 shows that owners follow the Hotelling’s rule, thus, their decisions are 
based on rent. This implies that owners of oil resources (perhaps the private operators) would 
extract rather than keep the resource in the ground when they anticipate a future drop in profits 





16 The developments in this paragraph are covered extensively in the Oil and Gas Year Brazil 2019 published in 
collaboration with the Rio de Janeiro State Federation of Industries (Firjan) and Brazil’s National Agency of 
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP); Petrobras "Annual Report 2018". 
17 For example, Equinor, Shell and ExxonMobil have all committed to increasing their investment in Exploration 
and Production in Brazil (EPE, 2019). 
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Table 4.1. Dynamic linear regression model of oil production in Brazil 
Variables ∆(Oil Production)t 
 (1) Model with a 
constant 
(2) Model without a 
constant 
∆(Oil production)t-1 0.268* 0.522*** 
 (0.161) (0.136) 
∆(Ethanol production) t-1 0.000530* 0.000639** 
 (0.000285) (0.000306) 
∆(Gas production) t-1 -0.255 0.542 
 (0.723) (0.705) 
∆(Crude oil prices) t-1 -0.0264 -0.0432 
 (0.0383) (0.0409) 
Constant 2.314**  
 (0.919)  
Observations 36 36 
Parms 5 5 
RMSE 3.4885 3.724 
R-Square 0.1612 0.5029 
P>chi2 0.1403 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Our post estimation Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for residual autocorrelation reveals the 
presence of no autocorrelation at the optimal lag. No evidence of serially correlated residuals 
was found for the model after testing for up to AR(4) in the LM test in Table A.2. The 
Eigenvalue stability condition suggests all eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle implying that the 
model satisfies the stability condition (Figure A.1). The Jarque-Bera test (Table A.3) for normally 
distributed disturbances shows that the equation of interest—the equation for oil production, 
Equation 3.1, is normal. These test results indicate that the relationship established between the 
regressors and oil production is consistent, asymptotically efficient, and dynamically stable and 
that OLS estimation provides the best possible estimates (Greene 2005). 
The responses of oil production to positive shocks (or innovations) to energy and price 
variables are presented in Figure 4.1. The impulse responses are constructed under the 
assumption of a one standard deviation shock from regressors. In each graph, we present the 
95% confidence interval as the graph confidence bands. We find persistence in the shocks 
whether we estimate a model with a suppressed constant or not, therefore, we report shocks for 
only the model with a constant. 
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Figure 4.1. Impulse responses of oil to positive shocks from regressors 
Results from the impulse response graph provides no evidence to support the claim that 
shocks (one standard deviation) from oil prices, ethanol production, and gas production lead to a 
statistically significant response from oil production. Impulses from oil prices, ethanol 
production, and gas production do not result in a statistically significant change in oil production 
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Figure 4.2. CO2 Emissions by energy source (MT CO2) 
From 1990, Brazil’s carbon emissions have exhibited an upward trend with the year 2014 
recording the highest CO2 emission of approximately 505 MT (Figure A.2). In terms of 
emissions by energy sources, the production of oil accounts for the largest share of CO2 
emissions among the three energy sources. Until the year 2008, coal production resulted in much 
greater carbon emissions than the production of gas. However, in 2008 as well as the year 2012 
and beyond, the production of gas has accounted for higher carbon emissions than coal (Figure 
4.2).  
The Brazilian transport sector has been a dominant force in carbon emissions over the years. 
Over the period 1990-2017, the sector has accounted for the greatest share of carbon emissions. 
Until the year 2012, electricity and heat production resulted in only a small proportion of CO2 
emissions. However, beyond this period, the amount of carbon emissions by the sector is nearing 
that produced by the industry sector. The least amount of carbon emissions is produced by the 








































































Figure 4.3. CO2 Emissions by sector (MT CO2) 
 
For a strong green paradox to exist, the net CO2 emissions have to be positive. Thus, the 
amount of CO2 emitted from fossil fuels must outweigh the corresponding reduction in CO2 from 
ethanol due to the substitution of ethanol for fossil fuels (specifically oil). To provide evidence 
for the strong green paradox, we specify that crude oil emits 0.43 metric tons CO2/barrel (EPA 
2019). To specify all units related to CO2 emissions in one thousand barrels, the 0.43 metric tons 
CO2/barrel will imply that every one thousand barrels of oil produced emit an equivalent of 430 
metric tons of CO2. 
While a thousand barrel of crude oil emits 430 metric tons of CO2, we evaluate the 
proportional CO2 emissions reduction from ethanol, due to a one-for-one substitution of ethanol 
for oil by a scale factor b, given the computed short and long-run elasticities. We define b	as the 
proportion of CO2 that is not released into the atmosphere due to a one-for-one replacement of oil 
with ethanol fuel. Specifically, b captures the proportion of CO2 emissions reduction from 
ethanol, on a one-for-one substitution for oil, resulting from a one percent increase in the 
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of the proportional CO2 reduction factor (b) ranging from 0.1 to 3.  
As shown in Table 4.2 below, a strong green paradox exists if the CO2 emission reduction 
resulting from a one-for-one substitution of ethanol for fossil fuel is less than 0.73 in the short 
run and 2.44 in the long run. This implies that ethanol production in Brazil results in a net 
increase in CO2 emissions if the emission reduction from ethanol that is substituted for oil is less 
than 73 percent in the short run and 244 percent in the long run. However, evidence for a strong 
green paradox in Brazil erodes whenever emission reduction from ethanol based on a one-for-
one substitution of ethanol for oil is greater than 0.73 in the short run and 2.44 in the long run. 
These results provide evidence for a strong green paradox in the Brazilian context.   
The highest net CO2 emission occurs when the CO2 emission reduction from substituting 
ethanol for oil is 10 percent. At this level, the corresponding CO2 emission is 569,210 MT in the 
short run and 2,095,970 MT in the long run. These values respectively correspond to 0.117 
percent and 0.430 percent of total Brazil’s CO2 emissions from energy consumption. The 
proportion of Brazil’s emissions to total emissions from energy consumption reduces to 0.098 
percent and 0.412 percent in the short and long runs respectively when the per-unit CO2 
emissions reduction from replacing oil with ethanol increases to 20 percent.  
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Table 4.2. The effect of ethanol production on Brazil’s CO2 emissions 
 Change in CO2 emission due to a 1% increase in biofuels production (metric tons CO2) 
1% rise in ethanol 
production 
Increase in oil from a 
1% rise in ethanol 
production  0.1 0.2 0.50 0.60 0.73 0.9 2 2.73 3 
SR 2085 1532 569210 479534 210506 120829 0 -148199 -1134635 -1527252 -2031395 
LR 2085 5083 2095970 2006315 1737350 1647695 1526894 1378730 392525 0 -504025 






SR 0.117 0.098 0.043 0.025 0 -0.030 -0.233 -0.314 -0.417 
  LR 0.430 0.412 0.357 0.338 0.314 0.283 0.081 0.000 -0.103 









There are several caveats with the analysis. First of all, the changes in CO2 emissions are 
highly sensitive to the energy data (i.e. ethanol and oil production in 2018), computed short and 
long-run elasticity values, and the approximate conversion rates. Any significant change in any 
of these factors will alter the outcome in Table 4.2. Also, our computations for the change in CO2 
emissions relative to total CO2 emissions from energy use and changes in CO2 emissions are 
based on 2018 emissions and energy data. This implies that our assessment is explicitly limited 
to this baseline year, and results do not reflect overall CO2 emissions over the study period (thus, 
1981 to 2018). We, therefore, advise that, since our computations do not use high-frequency data 
to evaluate the existence of a strong green paradox or otherwise, these results must be interpreted 
with caution. These notwithstanding, our conservative results provide evidence for a strong green 
paradox in the Brazilian context. 
It is possible that other factors aside the green paradox could potentially lead to a similar 
outcome as obtained in this study. Factors such as Petrobras’ internal production targets and the 
discovery of new oil fields among others, could result in greater extraction independent of an 
ethanol expansion. Even if this is true, we argue that the dominant factor driving our results is the 
green paradox based on two reasons. First, the Brazilian government’s policy intervention 
designed to decrease the cost of ethanol by investing in and subsidizing the domestic ethanol 
industry has increased ethanol production resulting in the observed supply response from oil 
producers. Even if we suspect that Petrobras’ production target and the discovery of oil fields 
have potentially resulted in increased production of oil, these effects are only minimal and do not 
explain much of the observed supply response relative to the reaction generated by greater 
ethanol production. 
Secondly, the Brazilian fuel market's uniqueness provides reasonable evidence to support the 
proposition that our results are driven by the green paradox and not other alternative forces. 
Brazil is the only country in the world with dedicated ethanol pumps at various fuel stations 
providing the opportunity to easily assess ethanol fuel. The ability of consumers to easily 
substitute between ethanol and oil at minimal or almost zero search and transaction costs 
generates competing use for ethanol and oil. Even in the phase of increased production targets 
and/or discoveries, the observed competition between the two alternative fuels would trigger a 
much greater supply response from oil producers. Thus, with the ease of accessing ethanol fuel, 
the supply response from oil suppliers due to competition from ethanol usage will be greater than 
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the supply response generated by, say new discoveries. It must be pointed out that discovery does 
not imply extraction. Therefore, we argue that a possible way of inducing extraction even on 
newly discovered wells is through competition generated from the ethanol sector. Since 
competition from the ethanol sector threatens the future profits of oil suppliers, the natural 
response is to increase current extraction as captured in our results. For these reasons, we can 
ascribe the observed supply response from oil owners to the green paradox (i.e., increased 
extraction due to expansion in ethanol production) rather than other alternative factors. 
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After Sinn (2008) ignited the debate on the green paradox, several studies have examined when a 
green paradox may occur under different policy scenarios. A very comprehensive analysis 
concerning the theoretical mechanisms that could result in a green paradox is provided by van 
der Werf and Di Maria (2012). They analyze conditions under which well-intended emission 
correction policies may lead to undesirable unintended consequences—a green paradox. 
Generally, a green paradox may emerge under four possible conditions: (a) Significant time lags 
between policy announcement and implementation (Ssmulders, Tsur, and Zemel 2012; Di Maria, 
Smulders, and Van der Werf, 2012); (b) Unreasonable pricing of carbon (Hoel, 2010); (c) 
Policies that favor alternative energy to fossil fuels (Grafton et al., 2014; van der Ploeg and 
Withagen, 2012); and (d) Unilateral climate policies (Sen, 2016). 
  In this study, we empirically investigate the third condition by evaluating whether Brazil’s 
biofuel policy aimed at reducing domestic demand for fossil fuels whiles promoting the use of 
ethanol and at the same time taking advantage of its surplus sugarcane supply go against the 
spirit of the proposed regulation. In particular, we study whether Brazil’s ethanol expansion has 
resulted in greater oil extraction—a weak green paradox, and/or let to an increase in net carbon 
emissions—a strong green paradox. 
 The results indicate that oil extraction has increased as a result of Brazil promoting greater 
ethanol production. Specifically, the change in oil production in the following period increases 
by 0.53 m3 (0.000530 MT) to 0.64 m3 (0.000639 MT) following a cubic meter rise in the change 
in ethanol production in the preceding year, providing evidence for the weak green paradox. The 
computation of the short and long-run elasticities reveal that a one percent rise in the change in 
ethanol production would increase the change in oil production by 1.5 percent in the short-run 
and 4.9 percent in the long-run. The impulse response analysis, however, provided no support for 
the claim that an innovation that triggers an expansion in ethanol production produces a response 
from oil producers. 
Whether the rise in oil production following an expansion in ethanol production has led to 
an overall rise in CO2 emissions required that we analyze net CO2 emissions based on a one-for-
Chapter 5 – 
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one substitution of ethanol for oil. Our analysis indicates that net CO2 emission in Brazil is 
positive if the CO2 emission reduction resulting from a one-for-one substitution of ethanol for 
fossil fuel is less than 73 percent in the short run and 244 percent in the long run, thus, evidence 
for a strong green paradox. This outcome suggests that Brazil’s ethanol policy aimed at reducing 
domestic demand for fossil fuels whiles promoting the use of ethanol and at the same time taking 
advantage of its surplus sugarcane supply could have produced effects that go against the spirit 
of the proposed regulation. 
Although these findings provide evidence for the green paradox in the Brazilian context, our 
results are subject to caveats that require that our outcome must be interpreted with caution. The 
unavailability of high-frequency state-level production data to test particularly the strong green 
paradox presents some data limitations in our studies. Also, our assessment of the strong green 
paradox is explicitly limited to a specific baseline year and results do not reflect overall CO2 
emissions over the study period. Nevertheless, our findings have provided some empirical 
evidence that indicates that Brazil’s ethanol policy could, paradoxically, have caused overall 
carbon emissions to increase.  
Our results support the view that a single emission correction policy may not be adequate to 
tackle the green paradox. Perhaps, policies designed to address the world’s greatest public good 
problem should address both demand and supply simultaneously. Tackling the green paradox 
only from the supply or demand side of the market may not yield the desired outcome of 
reducing net CO2 emissions. At the very least, Brazil and other policymakers must carefully 
evaluate a one-sided policy to ascertain whether or not their implementations have the potential 
of increasing fossil extraction and ultimately increasing CO2 emissions whether in the present or 
near future. Also, the Brazilian government, as well as other policymakers, should consider the 
implementation of complementary policies in competing energy industries such that the 
unintended undesirable penalties of implementing lone policies are eliminated, or at worse 
minimized.  Lastly, when a single emission correction policy such as an ethanol subsidy is 
inevitably relevant, policymakers should cautiously consider to what extent the ethanol subsidy 
should increase. This is relevant because the degree of such an incentive does not only influence 
the ethanol industry but also plays a crucial role in the extraction behavior of oil producers.  
This study provides new insights into the Brazilian energy sector by shedding light on one of 
the most important challenges facing the world today, climate change. However, a further step 
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would be to consider the effects of multiple emission correction policies, such as the concurrent 
implementation of a carbon tax and an ethanol subsidy on emissions by using long data which 
admittedly are difficult to obtain. Additionally, further research is needed to test the green 
paradox in a resource market with imperfect competition. In the presence of market power, a 
renewable incentive may not yield the desired outcome since dominant fossil fuel producers 
could maintain and reinforce their monopoly power by undercutting oil prices to keep renewable 
producers out of the market. This is an area that future research could focus to provide sound 
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Table A.1. Regression estimates for Equation 3.2 to Equations 3.5. 




∆(Crude oil  
Prices)t 
∆(Oil production)t-1 -38.19 -0.0405 -0.777 
 (103.1) (0.0441) (0.759) 
∆(Ethanol production)t-1 0.0646 -0.000133* -0.00185 
 (0.183) (7.83e-05) (0.00135) 
∆(Gas production)t-1 -289.9 -0.0739 -3.341 
 (463.9) (0.198) (3.415) 
∆(Crude oil prices)t-1 13.69 -0.00948 0.138 
 (24.59) (0.0105) (0.181) 
Constant 1,053* 0.839*** 5.897 
 (589.6) (0.252) (4.340) 
Observation 36 36 36 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Computation of short-run and long-run elasticities 
The regression equation is specified as: 
∆"#$! = &" + ("#∆"#$!$" + )"%∆*+ℎ-./$!$" + 0"&∆1-2!$" + 3"'∆45#67!$" (A. 1) 
Using only significant variables from the regression results from Table 4.1, Equation A. 1  
reduces to: 
∆"#$! = &" + ("#∆"#$!$" + )"%∆*+ℎ-./$!$" (A. 2) 































where * is ethanol production. 




604.264 + 0.268 =
6.117




∈)	= 1.489473 (A. 5) 
Thus, the short-run elasticity of change in oil production in period L with respect to a change in 
ethanol production in period L − 1	is 1.489473. 
The long-run elasticity of change in oil production in period L with respect to a change in 
ethanol production in period L − 1	(∈∗(	) is computed using the formula: 
∈∗(=	
∈)	
1 − ("# ∗∗
 
But, ("# ∗∗= =
&"
∆"#$!$"


















(1 − 0.698537) 
(A. 6) 
∈∗(	=	4.940811            (A. 7) 
 
Table A.2. Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation 
Lag Chi2 df Prob>Chi2 
1 19.4033 16 0.24831 
2 24.7661 16 0.07406 
3 36.6002 16 0.00239 
4 26.1873 16 0.05145 
 
Table A.3. Jarque-Bera test for normality 
Equation Chi2 df Prob > chi2 







Figure A.1. Stability test of VAR estimates 
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Declare Data as Time Series 
tsset year, yearly 
 
Describe Data 
sum oilproduction ethanolproduction gasproduction crudeoilprices 
 
Generate time trend 
gen Trend=_n 
 
Select optimal lag length 
varsoc oilproduction gasproduction ethanolproduction crudeoilprices, 
maxlag(4) exog (Trend) 
 
ADF test for Unit root 
dfuller oilproduction, trend lags (1) 
dfuller ethanolproduction, trend lags (1) 
dfuller gasproduction, trend lags (1) 
dfuller crudeoilprices, trend lags (1) 
 
First difference of ADF test 
dfuller d.oilproduction, lags (1) 
dfuller d.ethanolproduction, lags (1) 
dfuller d.gasproduction, lags (1) 
dfuller d.crudeoilprices, lags (1) 
 
DF-GLS test for Unit root 
dfgls oilproduction, trend ers 
dfgls ethanolproduction, trend ers 
dfgls gasproduction, trend ers 
dfgls crudeoilprices, trend ers 
 
First difference of DF-GLS test 
dfgls d.oilproduction, ers 
dfgls d.ethanolproduction, ers 
dfgls d.gasproduction, ers 
55 
dfgls d.crudeoilprices, ers 
 
Phillips-Perron test for Unit root 
pperron oilproduction, trend 
pperron ethanolproduction, trend 
pperron gasproduction, trend 
pperron crudeoilprices, trend 
 
First difference of Phillips-Perron test 
pperron d.oilproduction  




Perform Johansen cointegration test 
vecrank oilproduction ethanolproduction gasproduction 
crudeoilprices,trend(trend) lags (1) max 
 
Unrestricted VAR model in first difference with a constant 
var d.oilproduction d.ethanolproduction d.gasproduction d.crudeoilprices, 
lags(1/1)  
 
Unrestricted VAR model in first difference without a constant 
var d.oilproduction d.ethanolproduction d.gasproduction d.crudeoilprices, 
noconstant lags(1/1) 
 
Impulse Response Function 
irf create varbasic, set(varbasic, replace) 
irf graph oirf, set(varbasic) irf(varbasic) impulse(D.ethanolproduction 
D.gasproduction D.crudeoilprices) response (D.oilproduction) yline(0) 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test for Autocorrelation 
varlmar, mlag(4) 
 
Test for Stability 
varstable, graph dlabel mcolor(black) msize(medsmall) msymbol(circle) 
rlopts(lcolor(eltgreen)lwidth(medthin) lpattern(solid) connect(stairstep)) 
56 
legend(off) 
 
Normality test 
varnorm, jbera 
